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Abstract 
This article explores the experiences that birth mothers face in adoption proceedings within a 
socio-legal context. With analysis of data from interviews with 32 birth mothers synthesised 
with the relevant provisions of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, it is argued that ingrained 
unfairness and a lack of accountability exists in the legal and administrative system where 
birth mothers’ rights are concerned. Analysis extends to the social problems of blame and 
stigmatizing of birth mothers which originates from those agencies involved in the adoptions. 
It highlights the perspectives and voices of birth mothers, who are seldom the focus in leading 
discourses of professional practice in this area. This research moves some way towards 
equalising this disparity by acknowledging their experiences and arguing that what they have 
to say should be noted by professionals involved in adoption practice. The findings 
demonstrate the interrelationship between birth mothers and the law, with critical examination 
of the results in relation to previous research and jurisprudence from the family courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights, both of which demand fairness and proportionality in 
adoption proceedings.      
Keywords: Adoption and Children Act 2002, Birth mothers, Adoption, Socio-Legal 
Research  
 
Introduction  
The title of my PhD thesis is ‘I have never mattered less in this world than during my children’s 
adoption’. These were the words of Rachel, one of the women I interviewed to explore the 
experiences that birth mothers2 face in adoption proceedings. Rachel’s statement 
encompassed the collective voice of the birth mothers who participated in the research; they 
articulated complete disempowerment and feelings of worthlessness once the decision had 
been made to place their children for adoption. The adoptions in this research were initiated 
by local authorities and ordered by the family courts, many without parental consent. They are 
                                                          
1 Lisa is a former University of Plymouth student who is now a full time law lecturer in the School of 
Law, Criminology and Government specialising in Public Law and Family Law. She was awarded her 
PhD in October 2018, lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk    
2 The term ‘birth mother’ is used throughout the study to identify the target population of the research.   
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adoptions of ‘looked after’3 children in whose best interests it was decided that permanent 
removal from their biological families was required.   
The analysis of data from interviews with 32 women was synthesised with the relevant 
provisions of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA), the statute that governs adoption. As 
public bodies, local authorities and the courts must ensure their powers are exercised in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the findings 
determined that ingrained unfairness and a lack of state accountability exists in the legal and 
administrative system where birth mothers’ rights are concerned. The need for fairness in 
adoption practice is an overreaching principle of jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), with emphasis placed on proportionality under Article 8 of the 
Convention, right to privacy and family life.  
Whilst unfairness was a significant factor in operational practice, there were additional social 
problems of blame and stigmatisation, both of which play a major role in the lives of birth 
mothers. This treatment originated primarily from agencies involved in adoption processes 
and was sustained within birth mothers’ own communities. This forced many of them to deny 
the existence of their adopted children to avoid stigma, causing them to feel marginalised and 
isolated. This article presents just some of the findings, which include birth mothers’ right to 
be notified of adoption plans, their consent to adoption and the court dispensing with their 
consent, final ‘goodbye’ contacts between mothers and their children, their involvement in the 
adoption process and post adoption contact. It concludes with a discussion on the weaknesses 
in the remedies available for birth mothers and suggestions for more considerate professional 
practice.       
A Socio-Legal Approach  
In some institutions, it is now acceptable for legal researchers to move into sociological 
research methodologies that support and enhance a study of the law – a socio-legal approach. 
In straightforward terms this is defined as  
A sociological approach which seeks to gain empirical knowledge and an 
understanding of how the law and legal proceedings impact on the parties involved. It 
fills a gap in the understanding of 'law in action' found in black letter methodology 
perspective.4  
This design was chosen because legal theory fails to paint a true picture of the social impact 
of adoption on birth mothers. It is argued that people who know very little about the law can 
educate us to the reality of a legal phenomenon through their own experiences. This research 
highlights the perspectives and voices of birth mothers who are seldom the focus in leading 
                                                          
3 This is the term used to describe children in the care of local authority Children’s Services.  
4 British Library: An introduction to collections, Socio Legal Studies Association (2018).  
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discourses of professional practice in this area. The thesis therefore moved some way towards 
equalising the disparity by prioritising birth mothers and arguing that what they have to say 
should be acknowledged by professionals involved in adoption practice. The findings 
demonstrate the interrelationship between birth mothers and the law, with critical examination 
of the data set in relation to previous research and jurisprudence from the family courts. 
Overall, it was found that there are deeply concerning inconsistencies between the benchmark 
legal requirements and birth mothers’ experiences of adoption practice, with strong evidence 
of denial of legal entitlements and an absence of professional accountability that in some 
cases sailed dangerously close to breaches of Articles 6 (the right to a fair trial) and 8 of the 
ECHR.  
 
1 What the Literature on Birth Mothers Revealed  
There is a lack of research that encompasses both legal and social approaches towards birth 
mothers’ experiences. Previous studies by Winkler and Van Keppel, Boucher, Howe, Logan 
and Mason and Selman5 investigated the psychological and social effect of adoption on birth 
mothers, but almost nothing is known about their experiences of the law. The law requires 
their involvement to some degree with local authorities, the courts and other agencies who 
are empowered under the ACA to work in adoption services, therefore more needed to be 
known about these interactions. Charlton’s research into compulsory adoption found birth 
mothers’ needs were ignored by such bodies and their views carried no credibility.6 Similarly, 
Memarnia argued that birth mothers’ emotional reactions to losing their children were treated 
as insignificant by professionals.7 The lack of research into birth mothers is argued as a 
primary reason why their rights and entitlements are often overlooked by professionals. Alan 
Rushton highlights that the focus of adoption research is placed on adopted children and their 
adoptive families; this then reinforces the invisibility of birth mothers and permits a disregard 
of their needs.8 Gaining knowledge about the circumstances of women in the periods leading 
                                                          
5 Winkler, R., Van Keppel, M., Relinquishing Mothers in Adoption: Their Long-term Adjustment, 
(1984). This Australian study influenced researchers in Scotland and Britain to carry out similar 
research. Bouchier, P., Lambert et al., Parting with a Child for Adoption: the birth mothers 
perspective, (1992) BAAF. This study carried out under a social work discipline and concerns women 
who parted with a child during the 1960s and early 1970s. Howe, D, Sawbridge, P, et al., Half a 
Million Women: Mothers Who Lose Their Children by Adoption, (1992). Logan, J., ‘Birth Mothers and 
their Mental health: Unchartered Territory’ (1996) 26 British Journal of Social Work 609. Mason, K, 
Selman, P., ‘Birth Parents Experiences of Contested Adoption’, (1997) 21 The Journal of the 
Association of British Adoption and Fostering Agencies 21-28. 
6 Charlton, L., Crank, M., et al., Still Screaming: Birth Parents Compulsory Separated from their 
Children, (1998), 5.  
7 Memarnia, N, Nolte, L., et al ‘It felt like it was night all the time: listening to the experiences of birth 
mothers whose children have been taken into care or adopted’ (2015) 39(4) Adoption and Fostering: 
the journal of the Association of British Adoption and Fostering Agencies 303 at p.305. 
8 Rushton, A., Social Care Institute for Excellence: ‘The Adoption of Looked After Children: A scoping 
review of research’, (2003), 34-35.   
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up to their children’s adoption is crucial if intergenerational family problems are to be 
recognised and addressed.  
  
2 Adoption: The Most Serious Interference in Family Life 
Adoption is a controversial and regularly debated topic.9 Successive governments have been 
politically driven to increase adoption and ‘fast track’ the process to have children adopted as 
quickly as possible.10 This policy has met with disquiet and calls to ensure adoption is always 
truly carried out in a child’s best interests. This is primarily because an adoption order 
terminates the legal relationship between a child and his birth parents.11 It is permanent and 
irrevocable. The adopters become the child’s legal parents, as if the child had been born to 
them. This ‘legal fiction’12 has been challenged in recent times by leading academics13 who 
express a preference for more open adoptions, which maintain links with the birth family by 
ongoing contact.14 Traditional adoption sits uncomfortably alongside new open adoption 
concepts, but the severance of birth parents’ rights is said to be a key issue in encouraging 
adopters to come forward.15 Whenever a decision is being made concerning the adoption of 
a child, his or her welfare is the paramount consideration.16 Parental consent to adoption17 is 
a key requirement but it can be dispensed with if the child’s welfare requires it.18 This approach 
has generated a great deal of debate as to whether sufficient consideration has been afforded 
to the rights of birth parents.19  
The substantive law governing adoption is found in the ACA. The ACA aligned adoption law 
with the overreaching aim of the Children Act 1989.20 ACA sections 1(1) and 1(2) provide that 
‘whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision, the child’s welfare, throughout 
his life, is the paramount consideration’. This means the child’s welfare will always override 
the rights and needs of birth families. The principle of paramountcy has the aim of deterring 
the courts from placing birth parents’ rights over the making of an adoption order. The courts 
                                                          
9 For example, in 2014 the popular press reported on ‘Adoption Week’ with reports into all aspects of 
adoption policy and law. See Peach, D., Adoption Week: What it means to be an Adopted Child in 21st 
Century Britain, The Independent, 7 November 2014. 
10 Burns, J., David Cameron Bids to Speed up Adoption Process, BBC News, 2 Nov 2015.  
11 ACA s.46.  
12 Ryburn, M., ‘The Effects of an Adversarial Process on Adoption Decisions’, (1993) 17(3) Adoption 
and Fostering 20, 39.    
13 See Bainham, A. ‘Arguments about Parentage’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal 322, 349. 
14 This preference is only cited in accordance with the child’s best interests.   
15 Harris-Short, S, Miles, J., et al., Family Law: Text Cases and Materials, (2015) 903.   
16 ACA ss.1(1) and 1(2).  
17 ACA s.19(1)(b).  
18 ACA s.52(1).  
19 Harris-Short Family Law 903.  
20 Children Act 1989 placed the welfare of the child as paramount on a statutory footing.  
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ensure the child’s welfare is paramount by having regard to the welfare checklist in s1(4). 
Considerations include the child’s wishes and feelings and the effect on him of ceasing to be 
a member of his original family, the harm or risk of harm to the child and the relationship of 
the child with relatives. When the Act was passed, the judiciary provided guidance on its 
purpose. In Re F21 Wall LJ, said 
It is not, I think, controversial to say that the 2002 Act had four main objectives. The 
first was to simplify the process. Second was to enable a crucial element of the 
decision-making process to be undertaken at an earlier stage. The third was to shift 
the emphasis to a concentration on the welfare of the child; and the fourth was to avoid 
delay.22 
The domestic courts have consistently acknowledged the severe effect of adoption on family 
life. They have generally embraced the Strasbourg jurisprudence that stipulates adoption 
‘must be imperative or demanded rather than merely optional or desirable’.23 In Down Lisburn 
Health and Social Services Trust24 Lady Hale described adoption as ‘the most draconian 
interference with family life possible. More recently, in B (A Child)25 Lord Wilson observed 
ECtHR rulings, affirming that ‘a high degree of justification is needed under article 8 if a 
decision is to be made that a child should be adopted against the wishes of the child's 
parents’.26 In Re B-S27, the Court of Appeal clarified the law concerning non-consensual 
adoption. Munby P asserted that adoption must be a last resort, there must be consideration 
of Article 8 positive obligations on the state to try to keep families together, the least 
interventionist approach is preferable and although the child’s interests are paramount, those 
interests may include being brought up by his natural family.28  
The provisions in the primary legislation have little significance to birth mothers’ rights, with 
the exception of parental consent and the welfare checklist. More relatable is the subordinate 
legislation in the form of the Adoption Agency Regulations 2005 (AAR), the Adoption Support 
Services Regulations 2005 (ASSR) and the Adoption National Minimum Standards 2014 
(NMS). The regulations, along with the NMS, form the basis of the regulatory framework under 
the Care Standards Act 2000 for the conduct of adoption agencies and adoption support 
agencies. The introductory list of values state that ‘Children, birth parents and families and 
adoptive parents and families will be valued and respected’. The NMS are issued by the 
Secretary of State and whilst they do not place legally enforceable obligations upon adoption 
                                                          
21 Re F (Placement Order) [2008] 2 FLR 550, para 72. 
22 Ibid. 
23 As per the Court of Appeal in Re S [2008] EWCA Civ 535 paras 91-101.  
24 Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust v H [2006] UKHL 36 at para 34.  
25 B (A child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] UKSC 33. 
26 para 34.  
27 Re B-S (Children) (Adoption: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
28 Para 26.  
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agencies and local authorities; they are directive in that they can be used by children, birth 
parents and birth families as a guide to what they should expect as a minimum the agency to 
provide and to do. Accordingly, the research questions for birth mothers were primarily drawn 
from the requirements of the Regulations and NMS.    
 
3 Methodology  
The aim was to carry out empirical29 research by interviewing approximately 25 birth mothers. 
Beyond the strictly academic context, the thesis sought to empower birth mothers by 
researching adoption on their behalf and disseminating the results in the context of their 
personal experiences. The research design was qualitative because this method provides the 
potential for obtaining rich and detailed data.30 This data, in the form of interview transcripts, 
informed the research about the lives of birth mothers. Traditional legal research methods 
concern a systematic exploration and explanation of legal doctrines. In contrast, qualitative 
research may begin with a lack of relatable theory. It holds the assumption that there is more 
than one correct form of knowledge, maintaining that there are many versions of reality. These 
are dependent upon, and relational to the context in which they are happening.31 This 
approach could therefore focus on and accept the narratives of participants as accurate 
accounts of their experiences without the need to measure similarities or disparities between 
each piece of data. However, upon final analysis it was found that individual accounts of 
adoption correlated so strongly that it was possible to present birth mothers’ ‘collective 
experience of adoption’.       
Research concerning human beings always requires ethical considerations. Seeking ethical 
approval provides the foundation to an ongoing process. This process demands that the 
researcher reflect continually throughout the study on their approaches to their methodology, 
their interactions with participants including their informed consent and rights to withdraw from 
the study, and crucially, the handling of collected data.32 In order to recruit participants, the 
research was advertised on parent information forums,33 inviting birth mothers to participate 
in an interview about their experiences of adoption. Upon enquiry, an information sheet was 
provided which outlined the aims of the study. Research of a sensitive nature must maintain 
                                                          
29 Empirical means that something (or its impact) is observable, see Punch, K, F., Introduction to 
Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, (2005) 27 
30 Braun, V., Clarke, V., Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners, (2013) 4. 
31 Ibid. 6.  
32 For a helpful guide on all aspects of ethics in qualitative research see Gilbert, N., Researching 
Social Life, (2008) 146, 196.  
33 Family Rights Group, Parent’s Discussion Board, (May 11 2015), https://goo.gl/t2V4tx   Coram, 
BAAF, Adoption, (2017) https://goo.gl/JXGEfh  Match Mothers, Online E-zine, (August 2015), 7 
https://goo.gl/9RM9Pz    
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confidentially, not just of participants’ identities, but of information they may provide about 
other parties. Accordingly, participants’ names were removed from the data and replaced with 
pseudonyms. These were confidentially linked to their real names only for the purpose of their 
right to withdraw. The interview schedule comprised of questions based on the legal process 
of adoption, and birth mothers’ views on the way society responded to their birth mother 
identity. The interviews were ‘semi structured’,34 focusing on a list of prepared questions, but 
with a flexible approach that would allow participants to respond to questions and elaborate 
on matters that were important to them.  
4 The Research Findings  
Interviewing was a protracted process. It took several months to build up a rapport with birth 
mothers because most were suspicious of academic research which they feared ‘would paint 
them in a bad light’. Although there was a great deal of initial interest in the research, many of 
the respondents were extremely uncomfortable with the idea of talking about their child’s 
adoption. Once a trusting relationship was achieved, the interviews generated a large amount 
of data, which then took a further four months to transcribe and analyse. The final data for 
analysis concerned the experiences of 32 women who identified as the sample population of 
birth mothers with children who were adopted following being looked after by a local authority. 
The adoptions occurred across 24 local authorities and were carried out under the ACA 
between 2005 and 2012 exclusively.  Collectively the participants have 56 adopted children, 
22 of which are boys and 34 of which are girls. The ages that the children were adopted range 
from the youngest being under the age of one to the eldest being ten. The birth mothers ranged 
in age from 22 to 46 at the time of their interviews in the spring and summer of 2015. The 
results of the interviews compared with the legal requirements of the legislation exposed flaws 
in the administrative practice and a lack of consideration for birth mothers in general.  
The Legal Requirement to Notify of the Plan to Place Child for Adoption  
The AAR regulation 19(3) provides that the adoption agency must, if their whereabouts are 
known to the agency, notify in writing the parent or guardian. However, over half of the 
respondents were not formally notified. Of particular concern were nine birth mothers recalling 
the matter of adoption being raised informally or ‘casually’ during child contact sessions35 and 
in two cases before babies were born. These findings are consistent with Proudman and 
Trevena who argue that there is a ‘presumption of adoption as soon as care proceedings are 
                                                          
34 Braun Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners 78. 
35 Whilst care proceedings were ongoing before final care orders were made under the Children Act 
1989. 
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first initiated by the removal of the child’.36 Likewise, Charlton found that birth parents in her 
study suspected that there was ‘a degree of collusion within adoption teams, parents felt they 
were not being told the full story. They believed that adopters were identified before care 
applications were made to the court.’37This concurs with a number of birth mothers’ 
convictions in the current study. Some believed that the subject of adoption was casually 
mentioned by practitioners or contact facilitators because behind the scenes ‘the plans were 
already in motion’. In some cases, this had the effect of convincing birth mothers they had no 
option other than to consent to their child being placed for adoption. Presumptions or 
suggestions of adoption early on in care proceedings contravene the ‘no order principle’ in 
s1(6) ACA, which provides that 
The court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers 
available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989); and 
the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the 
order would be better for the child than not doing so. 
This section means that an adoption agency and the court must consider all the available 
options starting with the least interventionist first. It follows that adoption is the most 
interventionist on a sliding scale with the least being no order at all, followed by residence 
orders, supervision and care orders and special guardianship orders.38 Even if it transpired 
that adoption was ‘mentioned’ during contact or whilst a mother was still pregnant, because 
all other options had been considered and dismissed, the respondents were not aware of this. 
Adoption plans, however preliminary, which are not formally disclosed to birth parents are 
unfair, raising questions about compatibility with human rights requirements. In G (Children)39 
Munby J referred to the importance of impartiality, 
Procedural fairness is mandated not merely by article 6 but also by article 8. Unfairness 
in the process may involve a violation of a parent’s rights. Unfairness at any stage of 
the litigation may involve breaches of article 6 and 8. Local authorities must appreciate 
that the protection afforded by article 8 guarantees fairness in the decision making 
process at all stages of child protection.   
It is therefore crucial that ‘fairness in decision making’ is applied to adoption plans that are 
transparent and in accordance with the law’s requirement to avoid incompatibility with the 
Convention.     
Consent to Placement for Adoption 
                                                          
36 Proudman, C and Trevena, F., ‘Setting Parents up to Fail is Integral to Care Proceedings’, (2012) 
Family Law, 987 at 989. 
37 Charlton, Still Screaming, 42.  
38 Bridge, C and Swindells, H., Adoption: The Modern Law, (2003) 140-141.  
39G (Children) [2003] EWHC 551 (Fam).    
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Birth parents providing statutory consent to placement empowers a local authority or an 
adoption agency to place a child with adopters.40 ACA section 19(1)(b) allows birth parents to 
provide general consent to placement without the involvement of the courts.41 Section 52(5) 
states that ‘”Consent” means consent given unconditionally and with full understanding of what 
is involved’. According to section 52(7) consent must be provided in accordance with 
government rules.42 For consent to be effective, it must be witnessed by a Children and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) officer and the consequences of giving consent 
to placement43 must be carefully and fully explained to birth parent(s) by both the local 
authority and Cafcass.  
Six birth mothers consented to placement of their child without being offered the opportunity 
to decide whether to agree or not. There was also a notable absence of legal advice in all but 
one case. There is contention between this practice and the adoption consent form which 
directs that ‘Before signing this form you are advised to seek legal advice about consenting to 
adoption and the effect on your parental rights. Publicly funded legal advice may be available 
from the Civil Legal Aid’.44 None of the respondents who consented were provided with a copy 
of the form prior to being asked to sign, so they were unaware of this fundamental prerequisite. 
It is the responsibility of Cafcass officers to advise parents on the implications of giving 
consent.45 Although Cafcass were the body obtaining consent in all cases, birth mothers felt 
the serious implications of giving consent were not explained to them. They spoke of feeling 
pressured to give consent raising concerns that it was not informed and given 
unconditionally.46 Charlton found that birth parents who consented felt ‘pressed, often on the 
advice of social workers or solicitors, the latter who were sometimes the party advising them 
that there was no point in fighting the adoption’.47  
Consented-to-adoption has significant legal and factual consequences, yet it is rarely referred 
to in the literature beyond the assertion that adoption ‘consent’ flows from the wish to ‘give up’ 
                                                          
40 The aim of placement is to enable consent to adoption to be acquired at placement stage and birth 
parents can subsequently only apply for leave to oppose an adoption order if there has been a 
change of circumstances.  
41 Allen, N., Making Sense of the New Adoption Law, (2007) 79. It is important to note that the giving 
of consent does not prevent the local authority from applying to court for a placement order.   
42 The forms for s19 consent were published in 2005 as part of the Practice Direction supplementing 
the Family Procedure (Adoption Rules) 2005. Forms A100, A101, A102.   
43 These consequences are: the child continues to be ‘looked after’ but the status of any ongoing 
contact may change because any contact order made under the CA is terminated. Parental 
responsibility is shared with the local authority and if there are prospective adopters they also share 
parental responsibility.     
44 The Consent to Adoption Form, (A104).  
45 Bainham, A, Children the Modern Law, (2005) 287. 
46 This is the statutory requirement for consent in ACA 2002 s.52(7). 
47 Charlton, Still Screaming, 43.  
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a child for adoption.48 Oakwater suggests that social workers and lawyers always ask birth 
mothers if they will consent to adoption ‘as uncontested adoption is easier and cheaper for 
them, quicker to implement, speeding the child’s journey through placement’.49 According to 
Lord Nicholls if a birth mother consents to adoption there is no infringement of her ECHR 
Article 8 rights.50 This means that in principle none of the consenting mothers had any 
protection under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Although this small number of birth 
mothers cannot be argued as representative, from their accounts the seriousness of giving up 
their legal rights to their child was somewhat downplayed by the professionals involved. This 
subsequently meant these women did not at the time appreciate the finality of their actions in 
respect of their relationships with their children.      
Dispensing with Consent: ‘Forced Adoption’ 
In circumstances where birth parents refuse or are unable to consent to their child’s 
placement, the courts can make a placement order. Section 21(3) provides that, 
The court may only make a placement order if the court is satisfied (a) that the parent 
or guardian has consented to the child being placed for adoption with any prospective 
adopters who may be chosen by the local authority and has not withdrawn the consent, 
or (b) that the parent’s or guardian’s consent should be dispensed with.51  
Paramountcy52 and the welfare checklist53 are pertinent to the dispensing of consent. In Re 
P54 the Court of Appeal held that cogent justification must exist before consent can be 
dispensed with and adoption must be a proportionate and legitimate response.55 In Re B56 
Lord Neuberger asserted that the ‘adoption of a child against her parents’ wishes should only 
be contemplated as a last resort, when all else fails’.57 Bridge argues that in extending the 
welfare principle to dispensing with parental consent ‘the court is able to completely override 
a parent’s wishes, even though they may be reasonable and notwithstanding that adoption 
involves irreversible legal separation legal separation of the child from his birth parents’.58 
Twenty birth mothers had their consent dispensed with by the court. Those who were aware 
of the local authorities’ application for placement opposed it from the time they knew of the 
                                                          
48 For helpful analysis on voluntary consent to adoption see, Allen Making Sense of the New Adoption 
Law 45-48.  
49 Oakwater, H., Bubble Wrapped Children, (2012) 8.   
50 Re B (Adoption by One Natural Parent to the Exclusion of Other) [2001] 1 FLR 589 para 29.   
51 The child’s welfare requiring consent to be dispensed with is the statutory test under ACA s52(1)(b). 
Note: the word requires for the purposes of the Act carries the connotation of ‘imperative’.   
52 ACA 2002 s.1(2). 
53 ACA 2002 s.1(4).  
54Re P (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 535. 
55 Standley, K., Family Law, (2010) 441.  
56 Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] UKSC 33.   
57 para 104.  
58 Bridge, Adoption: The Modern Law, 112.  
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plan for adoption. On further questioning they did not recall their solicitors or any other 
professional explaining consent to them and how it could be overridden, but in a number of 
cases they were ‘encouraged’ to consent by their solicitors.59 Over half of the respondents 
spoke of being actively involved in opposing care orders and attempting to secure more 
frequent contact with their children at the time placement orders were made.60 They failed to 
grasp the finality of the placement order, believing that the ‘fight wasn’t over until the adoption 
order’,61 but for many the placement order signified the end of their relationships with their 
children.     
This lack of understanding of the legal process could explain why so many birth mothers used 
the term ‘forced adoption’ in their narrative. The dictionary defines ‘forced’ as ‘obtained or 
imposed by coercion or physical power’.62 For the birth mothers this corresponds with their 
personal perspectives of adoption. Respondents’ narratives were notably similar and 
dominated by references to the involuntary and often violent nature of their experience of their 
children being removed and eventually adopted. Ryburn considers that forced adoption is not 
admissible in law but is exclusively based on moral principles,  
Forced adoptions find moral justification in the view that the state has a duty to 
intervene on behalf of its citizens or its future citizens, where they would otherwise be 
at significant risk. The debate about compulsory adoption is a moral one. It centres on 
questions such as: what constitutes adequate parenting? What forms of family life 
should we support which should we reject?63  
For Ryburn ‘forced adoption’ says more about the failings of parents than it does about 
children’s welfare. It is certainly true that parents’ deficiencies are forensically detailed 
throughout court reports. Parents who attend court must listen to graphic accounts of their 
neglectful behaviour, dysfunctional relationships and bad childcare decisions with only their 
counsel providing a medium for their defence.64  
Because the only legal requirement for dispensing with parental consent is a determination of 
the child’s welfare, it is probable that birth mothers’ perspectives of forced adoption will remain 
for as long as the law maintains such a provision. Their perception of forced adoption is likely 
                                                          
59 This finding concurs with Lauren Devine’s research where it was found that many lawyers seem do 
little more than ‘urge compliance’ once the evidence against parents has been collected. Devine, L, 
Parker, S., ‘Public Family Law cases in the context of Miscarriages of Justice’ (2015) Argument & 
Critique.  
60 Similar findings were made by Charlton, Still Screaming, 40.  
61 A comment made by Tracy BM32. 
62 The Oxford Dictionary.  
63 Ryburn, M., ‘The Effects of an Adversarial Process on Adoption Decisions’, (1993) 17:3, Adoption 
and Fostering, 39. 
64 Although birth parents’ counsel are not ‘defending’ them as would occur in a criminal trial, the 
adversarial process left parents feeling that they needed a ‘defence’.  
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to be a bi-product of the law intended to prevent the court prioritising the rights of birth parents 
over children needing permanence.    
The Importance of Saying Goodbye 
Before adoption birth families may be invited to a ‘goodbye meeting’ with their child. This is 
not a legal requirement, but it should not be considered as unimportant because of this,  
The goodbye meeting’ is a term for something that is inevitably distressing for a parent. 
These are important meetings and most birth parents find the strength to go through 
with them.65   
The Government has produced guidance for local authorities on helping birth families prepare 
for the goodbye meeting which aims to support both parents and their children; the importance 
of this meeting to children’s welfare is made evident, 
The Social Worker reinforces the important role the parent has played in the child’s 
life. Emphasize that because of the child’s love for the parent, it is important for the 
parent to give the child “permission” to be happy and to love and trust another family.66 
Six birth mothers said they were not offered the chance to say goodbye to their children before 
they were adopted. When asked if they knew why, three respondents thought their children 
had already been moved to another area some distance away. A further seven birth mothers 
were expecting a goodbye meeting which had been planned but this was cancelled due to 
concerns about the children’s ability to cope with the meeting. Most birth mothers who had a 
goodbye meeting with their children found the experience intensely painful and unnatural. This 
was largely because they were told to behave as though they were happy and pleased for 
their child but in doing so feared their children might perceive this as rejection. The 
respondents were worried about their children’s feelings during the goodbye meeting so 
supressed their own emotional needs 
It should not be neglected that effective management of such meetings is likely to be 
challenging for social workers also, particularly given their obligation to consider the child’s 
needs first and foremost. However, most of the birth mothers felt that no specific support was 
offered to them before or during the last contact. In fact, the general view was that goodbye 
meetings were arranged reluctantly and this averseness to the event translated into an 
unsupportive and tense atmosphere where birth mothers were pressured to say goodbye to 
their children and leave. This meant that such an important meeting was a profoundly 
unpleasant and negative experience for some birth mothers and possibly for their children as 
well. By showing sensitivity professionals will create a far more positive environment which 
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may also promote better outcomes for the children they are placing with adopters. Birth 
mothers who were not offered the chance to say goodbye felt strongly that there was a lack of 
openness and no explanation why the meetings had not gone ahead. In something as 
important as saying goodbye to a child it is vital that birth mothers know where they stand with 
clear explanations provided if final contact are not facilitated.  
Researchers argue that birth parents saying goodbye to a child is a vital component of 
adoption, to ensure the child ‘gains a sense of their history’.67 Julia Davis establishes that the 
elements of good practice with final contacts must involve a carefully thought out event 
requiring the involvement of the adoptive family (if there is one), the birth parents and social 
workers, each party will need to be supported and their own emotional needs must be 
acknowledged and not ignored. Davis emphasises that goodbye meetings should take as long 
as is necessary to ensure the child and his birth parents have adequate time together. Finally, 
birth mothers should not be left alone after the goodbye contact unless they specifically 
request it.68 This concurs with Charlton’s view that support is crucial for birth mothers following 
the final goodbye.69 In the current study several respondents who were not supported at all 
recalled feeling suicidal, and in two cases attempted suicide in the days following the goodbye 
meetings. Those who were treated with kindness and compassion felt more able to grieve 
naturally and eventually focus on what remained in their life rather than solely on what they 
had lost. 
 
The Right to have a Voice in Adoption Proceedings  
Wherever possible birth parents should have a voice and be listened to during the process of 
their child’s adoption. Boddy argues that ‘birth families need to be engaged with the decision-
making and care-planning process from the outset’.70 The law requires that ‘before a 
placement for adoption can occur a parent must be fully engaged in the decision-making 
process’.71 When making an adoption order the court must apply the welfare checklist in 
section 1 ACA. Section 1(3)(f)(iii) provides that the court must consider the wishes and feelings 
of the child’s relatives. According to para 12.8 of the NMS, the adoption agency must be active 
in its efforts to involve the birth family in the adoption planning.  
                                                          
67 Davis, J., Preparing for Adoption, (2014) 101-102. 
68 Ibid.   
69 Charlton, Still Screaming, 10.  
70 Boddy, J, Statham, J, et al., Beyond Contact: Work with families of children placed away from home 
in four European countries, Centre for Innovation and Research in Childhood and Youth (CIRCY) 
School of Education and Social Work, (2013).  
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Birth mothers’ right to be involved in the process of adoption also has been confirmed as a 
requirement by the ECtHR. In W v UK72 it was held that, 
The decision making process must be as such to secure that the parents views and 
interests are taken into account by a local authority’[and] ‘it must be determined if the 
parents have been involved in the decision making process to a degree sufficient to 
provide them with the requisite protection of their interests.73   
Furthermore, in Scott v UK74 it was held that once the child is in the care of the local authority 
and adoption is planned then the birth parents must be sufficiently involved in the planning 
process.  
Twenty-six birth mothers felt that they were not involved in the planning process and they did 
not believe that their wishes and feelings were considered at any stage. Respondents were 
not offered support, and neither were they kept updated of their children’s progress in 
placement. This corresponds with Charlton, who found that once adoption had been decided 
upon social workers were averse to discuss children at all with their birth parents;75 indeed 
some social workers felt it ‘was not therapeutic’76 to have birth parents involved in the process 
at all. Mason and Selman found that birth parents were not only excluded but were not kept 
informed of the progress of their child’s case77 Charlton argues that ‘there is no better test of 
the worth of any professional than how it treats those who are least able to exercise a say in 
the services that they want’.78  
The courts have also observed the shortcomings of local authorities in this area. In Re L79 
Munby J said,  
Too often in proceedings both the extent of a parent’s involvement in the crucial phases 
of the out of court decision making process fall short not just of the domestic law 
requirements but also of the standards demanded by articles 6 and 8 of the 
Convention.80  
It was held in R and H v UK81 that where adoption is the outcome, there is an unavoidable 
duty upon local authorities to ensure parents’ Article 8 rights are protected by their involvement 
in the decision making process and this is accounting for the widest margin of appreciation. 
Only in exceptional circumstances and if the child’s welfare demands it, should parents be 
                                                          
72 W v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 29.  
73 paras 63-64.  
74 Scott v United Kingdom [2000] 1 FLR 958.  
75 Charlton, Still Screaming, 21.  
76 Ibid. 42.  
77 Mason, ‘Birth Parents Experiences of Contested Adoption’, 22. 
78 Charlton, Still Screaming, 3.   
79 Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 Fam.  
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excluded from the process. Unfortunately, the assertions of the courts sometimes fail to 
account for the reality of adoption practice where it is argued ‘a human rights discourse in 
social work in relation to adoption is under developed’.82 
Lindley studied adoption agency practice and found that there were few opportunities for birth 
parents to ‘make direct representations to the (adoption) panel either in person or in writing 
on matters of importance to them’. This was primarily due to the agencies’ anxiety about 
protecting adopters’ identities and preserving the security of the placement.83 It is not known 
whether the refusal to hear birth parents supports a legitimate aim to protect placements, but 
agencies’ defensiveness and protectiveness of adopters simply reinforces the isolation felt by 
birth parents in both the short and long term.   
Post-Adoption Contact  
There has been a considerable amount of research into the phenomena of ‘open adoption’ in 
recent years,84 although some commentators have argued that ‘open adoption’ lacks a 
definitive meaning.85 In 1990 the Adoption Law Review86 considered open adoption. One of 
the key topics to emerge from the review is that of maintaining links by ongoing contact 
between a child and his birth parents after adoption87. Triseliotis suggests this should be 
considered as ‘adoption with contact.88Sloan describes open adoption as ‘the freer exchange 
of information between the parties to adoption as an alternative to secrecy’.89 From a human 
rights perspective, adoption without consent may become more compliant with the Convention 
if some contact is permitted between the child and his birth parents.90 The issue of contact 
with adopted children is a complex and controversial issue. There is little provision in the ACA 
for contact following adoption,91 although s 46(6) provides that the court ‘must consider’ 
whether the child’s welfare requires ongoing contact.92 Although the ACA makes allowances 
                                                          
82 Featherstone, B., Gupta, A et al. ‘The role of the social worker in adoption – ethics and human 
rights: An Enquiry’, The British Association of Social Workers, (2018) 13.  
83 Lindley, B ‘Partnership or Panic?’ A Survey of Adoption Agency Practice on Working with Birth 
Families in the Adoption Process’ (1998) The Journal of the Association of British Adoption and 
Fostering Agencies 21:4 at 31.  
84 For a helpful guide on the concepts of open adoption see Mullender, A., (ed.), Open Adoption, The 
Philosophy and Practice, (1991, BAAF).   
85 Lindley, ‘Partnership or Panic?’ 23. 
86 Prime Ministers Review: Adoption (July 2000), para 6.5, John Hutton MP, Hansard, (House of 
Commons), 26 March 2001, col 699.   
87 Allen Making Sense of the New Adoption Law 21.  
88 Triseliotis, J., ‘Open Adoption’, in Mullender, Open Adoption, 23.    
89 Sloan, B, ‘Post-Adoption Contact Reform: Compounding the State-Ordered Termination of 
Parenthood?’ (2014) 73 The Cambridge Law Journal 378 at 134. 
90 Hale, B., Fortin, J., Legal Issues in the Care and Treatment of Children with Mental Health 
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91 McFarlane, Child Care and Adoption Law, 166. 
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must first secure the leave of the court.  
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for contact, there is no presumption for contact as there is in the CA 1989.93 Following an 
adoption order, an application for post adoption contact can be made under section 8 of the 
CA, but the applicant must first secure the leave of the court.94   
It is rare for the court to make an order for post-adoption contact inter alia due to the fear of 
deterring adopters.95 It is more likely to be a written agreement which is legally unenforceable 
if contact does not occur or ceases. Allen notes that the legislation does not demand ongoing 
contact and thus ‘agencies have been able to develop policies and approaches largely 
unrestrained by a legal straightjacket’.96 This policy usually transpires as ‘letterbox contact’97 
in which the courts play no part. As one adoption service notes ‘currently the letterbox 
arrangements are morally, rather than legally binding, so they depend on the goodwill of all 
those concerned to keep them going’.98 Letterbox contact is indirect and consists of periodic 
letters99 passed between birth families and adoptive families via a local authority letterbox 
scheme. 
All the contact between birth mothers and the adopting family/children was arranged by local 
authorities by way of various agreements. Three respondents were advised that the adoptive 
families had decided against allowing contact and none had attempted to challenge this. 
Twenty nine birth mothers were initially offered some level of post adoption contact, but it was 
clear from analysis of the data that theory on post adoption contact is discrete from the reality. 
Theoretically the literature offers an objective evaluation, leading one to infer that birth parents 
dutifully and impassively cooperate with reliable and regular post adoption contact.100 In 
practice it is not that simple.  
The findings showed an inconsistent and unreliable process that left birth mothers confused, 
concerned about their lack of rights, and powerless if agreements for contact were not kept. 
Only two birth mothers had received the anticipated number of letters post adoption. Ten had 
received no letters despite being party to an agreement for annual letterbox. Seven of those 
participants had spent a significant amount of time fruitlessly contacting local authorities 
                                                          
93 Standley, Family Law 441-442 
94 Since the adoptions in this thesis all occurred pre-2013 these provisions would have applied. 
However, the Children and Families Act 2014, section 9, has amended the Adoption and Children Act 
2002, with the new insertion of section 51A and 51B. These new provisions now provide the court 
with a specific power to make an order for post-adoption contact when the court is making an 
adoption order or when an adoption order has been made. 
95 Ibid. 442. 
96 Allen, Making Sense of the New Adoption Law 21.  
97 Sloan, Post-Adoption Contact Reform 41.  
98 For example see, Oxfordshire County Council, Guidelines for Using the Oxfordshire Letterbox 
Service, https://goo.gl/WU3Jor  
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querying why they had not received letters. None felt that their enquiries were taken seriously, 
and they were not resolved. General advice was given that local authorities were not involved 
in the agreement other than to pass letters on once the adoption was final.  
In describing the long-term physical, mental and emotional effects of adoption on the lives of 
birth mothers, Mason identified adopted children’s whereabouts and welfare as birth mothers 
predominate concern.101 This is something that can never be redressed in an adoption where 
no form of contact has occurred. Theoretically, open adoption provides ‘in virtually all 
adoptions there will be an expectation for some limited indirect contact to continue’.102 This 
view is consistent with modern ideas about adoption, but the findings do not support this 
theory. For birth mothers who had contact agreements which failed to commence, these 
adoptions appear as ‘closed adoptions’. 
‘Closed adoption’ is where birth mothers are given no information about their child following 
placement.103 Closed adoption reverts practice to before the 1975 Children Act, where the law 
promoted secrecy, as Polly Toynbee notes, 
Once the adoption papers were signed a child was cut off for ever from his natural 
parents, an adoption order is the final and absolute utterance a court can make. It 
separates mother and child and guarantees that a child’s origins can be kept secret.104  
But the law has moved on, as Bridge makes clear ‘statutory provisions aimed at eradicating 
birth parents from the child’s life are pointless in the case of older children who have close 
emotional ties to their birth families. Seeking to deny the importance of these ties may well be 
inimical to the child’s interests’.105 Bainham criticises the practice which generally discourages 
parents from having any further interest in their children post adoption. He considers that the 
‘portrayal of this interest as interference is unduly negative and it reflects a cultural attitude to 
long term arrangements not shared by our European neighbours’.106 
In the absence of any letterbox, respondents were tormented by the thoughts that their 
children had suffered with the sudden severance of contact. They were unconvinced that their 
children did not miss them and did not experience feelings of intense loss which they feared 
may not be acknowledged by adult carers. These concerns are justified. Lindley argues that 
complete termination of contact between children and their birth families can create long-term 
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problems because ‘when earlier attachments are disregarded, the feelings do not go away but 
are simply driven underground’.107  
The judiciary has deliberated extensively on the matter of post-adoption contact, sometimes 
reaching differing conclusions. In Re KD108 the House of Lords indicated that post-adoption 
contact was not an automatic right for birth parents. Similarly, Macfarlane LJ has reflected that 
‘for 30 years or more the courts have accepted the principle that adoption with little or no 
contact with the natural family provides the best option for the child’.109 In SB v County 
Council110 Wall LJ noted ‘historically, post adoption contact between children and their birth 
parents has been perceived as highly exceptional’. However, a more generous view was held 
by Ward LJ in Re G,111  
[The benefit] of contact is the benefit that comes from children simply knowing who the 
natural parents are. It is to remove the sense of the ogre, as they reach adolescence 
and begin to search for their own identity. That is why the current research is in favour 
of some contact in adoption. 
Despite extensive research promoting open adoption, Harris-Short notes that the courts 
remain indisposed because of the ‘difficulty in reconciling a move towards openness with the 
traditional legal understanding of the nature of an adoption order’.112 Sloan suggests that the 
perpetual debate on the benefits/detriments of open adoption probably centre on the fact that 
if adoption were the only solution to the child’s long term needs then post adoption contact is 
unlikely to be appropriate.113 Similarly, Ryburn argues that where adoption is non-consensual 
it causes circumstances where maintaining links is impossible due to ‘the anxiety and fear it 
engenders in new carers and hostility provoked from the original family’.114 These arguments 
place local authorities in a difficult position with regard to the promotion of contact and perhaps 
go some way to explain why contact after adoption does not always appear to be embraced 
by those empowered to facilitate it. Macfarlane LJ reflects that with the passing of the ACA 
there was an expectation by some judges115 that contact ‘which at most concerned modest 
letterbox [may mean] a possible sea change under the Act’. His Lordship subsequently 
considered that a decade later there ‘has been no sea change’.116 
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5 Remedies for Procedural Unfairness and Recommendations for  
Considerate Practice 
The findings showed that birth mothers felt powerless where unfairness and inadequate 
procedure occurred. This was primarily because they had little awareness of their rights, no 
knowledge of a complaints process and there was no accountability within the agencies 
concerned. Available remedies for birth mothers in the event of poor decision-making, 
procedural error or unfair practice are virtually non-existent. For example, judicial review is a 
court based remedy when an individual wishes to claim that a local authority has acted ultra 
vires, but it is rare for this to be utilised in public child law.117 Judicial review is also only able 
to deal with procedural breaches and not problems within the system which is the primary 
problem in adoption processes.118 Even if it were possible for an application for judicial review 
to be lodged, the time limits imposed are short and strictly regulated. Under Civil Procedure 
Rule Part 54.5(1) an individual must make an application for permission to apply for judicial 
review not later than three months after the grounds upon which the claim is based first arose. 
For the birth mothers involved in this research it was years and not months before they came 
to realise that they had been unfairly treated; further, the idea of yet another course of litigation 
was repugnant to them, many commented that they never wanted to attend court again 
following the trauma they had experienced during their child’s care proceedings.  
The same limitations apply to applications under s7 of the HRA 1998.119 Although there are 
examples of parents bringing actions against local authorities who have infringed individuals’ 
rights, such as in C v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council,120 and more so recently in care 
proceedings,121 there is no available data on s7 claims in administrative adoption procedure. 
Making claims against public bodies for breach of the HRA is a complex matter which has a 
number of implications. It has been argued that ‘in most cases, pursuing an HRA application 
is simply not commercially viable’,122 if for example, an individual is funding their own court 
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authority on judicial review of the administrative process of adoption but see AB & Anor, R (on the 
application of) v The London Borough of Haringey [2013] EWHC 416, where the court made a 
quashing order on a local authority’s decision to undertake an enquiry pursuant to s.47 Children Act 
1989 into whether a child was suffering from significant harm. 
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costs, any award of damages may be significantly less than the cost of court proceedings.123 
The publicly funded claimant in a HRA claim who is also publicly funded in associated or 
connected proceedings under s25 LASPO, is vulnerable to a claim for recoupment of the costs 
of proceedings by way of statutory charge from any award of HRA 1998 damages, including 
access to legal aid.124 
It is essential that local authorities should be held accountable throughout the adoption 
process and birth mothers should be made aware of their legal rights and entitlements from 
the outset. Along with accountability, we are reminded of the state’s obligation to respect 
human dignity as a core requirement under the human rights instruments and the common 
law. The judiciary consider these values to be crucial where the state is involved with 
vulnerable people whose freedom of choice has been inhibited.125    
Birth mothers were for the most part unaware of their right to complain. The CA 1989 places 
a duty on all councils to establish and publicise a procedure for the consideration of complaints 
made to them.126 The Children Act 1989 Representations Procedure (England) Regulations 
2006 sets out the processes that must be followed by local authorities when they consider 
representations and complaints about the services they provide.127 The Regulations provide 
that certain adoption-related functions may be the subject of a complaint, those relevant here 
are: the provision of adoption support services, placing children for adoption, including 
parental responsibility and contact issues, duties on receipt of a notice of intention to adopt 
and a local authority considering adoption for a child.128 
The findings showed that only two respondents out of the 32 had made a formal complaint on 
the advice of their solicitors. The two complainants found the process complex, time 
consuming and impractical in terms of a redress. In most cases if a complaint against 
Children’s Services is upheld, the complainant will receive a written apology from the relevant 
manager, along with information about what action the department will take to ensure that 
lessons have been learned. Whether this is satisfactory in the event of unfair treatment or 
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erroneous procedure in adoption is questionable, Devine argues that the inadequacy of 
redress in pubic child law causes ‘severe and long lasting harm to families’.129       
The complaint process is designed for service users; therefore the procedure should be easy 
for individuals to access and understand. There should be adequate services available to 
assist the complainant in setting out clearly the issues they are unhappy with, this is of 
particular importance where the complainant has a special need or a disability. Given that this 
procedure may be the only avenue that can be taken by birth parents in the event of a 
complaint about administrative procedures, much more needs to be known about the 
accessibility and effectiveness of the process.     
Devine argues that in public child law the balance of state power and the rights of the individual 
is weighted in favour of the state. This applies both to the state’s powers under the CA 1989 
and the ACA 2002. She argues further that the intention of the legislation was to create a 
regulatory framework to solve or avoid problems that would occur without the statute.130 The 
overreaching aims of the ACA provisions designed for birth parents were to address the need 
for balance in child welfare decisions, because it was evident that paramountcy of the child’s 
welfare risked compromising proportionality, particularly where contested adoption was 
concerned. The birth parents’ Article 6 and Article 8 rights were primarily a cause for 
concern.131 The policy drift132 away from the intentions in the statute must therefore be 
addressed to restore the balance between the power of the state and the protection of parental 
rights.  
There is significant disadvantage to birth mothers in the lack of mandatory requirements in the 
subordinate legislation. A stricter observance of the Adoption Regulations and the NMS is 
crucial when adoption is part of a child’s care plan, at the very least the local authority should 
be compelled to ensure birth mothers are kept informed about their child’s adoption plan 
provided it is in the child’s interests to do so.133 This involvement must include formal 
notification of the plan to adopt, because only with the knowledge of this can they seek legal 
advice. A transparent and fair process is imperative if birth mothers’ human rights are to be 
protected. If consent to adoption is being sought, then before it is given, the consequences 
must be explicitly explained to birth mothers and witnessed, preferably in the event of her 
having sought legal advice. The law in the ACA and the Regulations is clear as regards the 
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requirements for consent. If the person seeking consent cannot be certain and free of doubt 
that the signatory is giving consent ‘unconditionally and with full understanding of what is 
involved’ then it should not be accepted. It is probable that this can only be completely 
unambiguous where there are at least two officials physically involved in obtaining consent as 
per the requirement of the law.134 Adoption may be inevitable, but birth mothers still retain the 
right to contest it in court.  
The current ‘letterbox contact’ system which encourages adopters to engage in the exchange 
of letters but then fails to monitor, facilitate or assist is inappropriate to such a crucial provision. 
In a time where open adoption is strongly evidenced as a benefit to many children, a more 
robust process is required that compels parties to maintain contact. If an agreement for contact 
cannot be honoured for good reason, then birth mothers should always be notified. It is simply 
unacceptable for women to remain uninformed when letters are of such profound importance 
to their wellbeing.  
The narratives on court processes were intertwined with complaints about ‘forced adoption’. 
Research carried out from the 1990s to the current day raises concerns about the trauma 
suffered by birth parents in public child law proceedings. This thesis’ findings replicate 
previous results. The Family Justice System may have evolved, but for many birth mothers 
the process has remained static. Initiatives such as the FDAC135 are one aspect of family 
justice which is improving outcomes for families both in and out of court, but there is a long 
way to go. Funding for the continuation of the FDAC continues to be uncertain and currently 
only parents with drug/alcohol problems are referred. A FDAC judge has stated that the model 
can and should be extended to families where addiction is not the primary cause of child 
protection interventions.136 She believes that the success of the FDAC in helping parents 
overcome their problems and care for their children is partly down to the direct interaction with 
the judge, or as she put it ‘I go beyond the barrier’. This is a compelling ideal that speaks not 
only of moving beyond the physical barrier of the bench but of the psychological barrier 
between parents and judges that has long existed in the adversarial courts. Research has 
already evidenced the success of the FDAC in keeping families together.137 This existing 
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137 For a helpful evaluation of the FDAC see Harwin, J, Ryan, M., et al., The Family Drug Alcohol 
Court (FDAC) Evaluation Project Final Report, (2011) Brunel University. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2019) 
 
44 
 
knowledge could be enhanced with further research into the FDAC model which seeks to 
understand the crucial elements that motivate parents to overcome the problems which can 
lead to child care proceedings and eventual adoption.    
The need for independent support during court proceedings is long overdue. The support 
should be separate from and different to any litigation friend or Makenzie friend. Often it is 
human and not additional legal support that is needed. The FDAC use ‘parent mentors’ to 
support parents. These are individuals who have themselves experienced addiction and child 
care proceedings, ‘FDAC parent mentors provide a volunteer befriending service to parents 
throughout their involvement with the court’.138 I would argue that a similar model could be 
introduced to support mothers during care and placement proceedings where empathic and 
non-judgmental support can make a significant difference to both the short and long-term 
wellbeing of birth mothers.     
Birth mothers should have the opportunity to be involved in the adoption process as much as 
is feasible. Their views should be sought and if it is possible to uphold any wishes they 
express, then this should be honoured. The rush to have children adopted is likely to be a 
significant reason why birth mothers are excluded from the process. Therefore, as soon as 
adoption is planned for a child they should be consulted. Important factors such as advising 
them if their children have moved in with adopters, if they are settling in, potential dates for 
contact and letterbox arrangements should be communicated directly to them. Birth mothers 
did not mind if plans were changed but they objected to not being told anything from the time 
their children’s final care orders were made. This increased their levels of distress significantly. 
The few birth mothers who were involved and informed coped far better with the process. 
It must be acknowledged  that birth mothers continue to be parents even if they are prevented 
from parenting their children, currently there is little evidence that this recognition exists within 
adoption services. Birth mothers have a role to play in their children’s future and therefore 
openness should be mediated along a continuum. This includes being kept informed and 
having contact if this is in the child’s best interests. Currently, birth mothers are all too often 
‘shut out’ of their children’s lives early on in care proceedings. Children should have access to 
information about their birth family’s life either directly or through a third party. Support for birth 
must be provided independently from the statutory framework and involve practitioners with 
no access to the child protection records. This lessens the risk that birth mothers will be 
stigmatised and allows them the autonomy to disclose their own experiences. All support, 
whether before, during or after adoption should be designed to empower and help women 
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make informed choices about their futures.139 As Macfarlane LJ has suggested there are long-
term benefits in ‘focussing for a time on the parent rather than exclusively on protecting the 
child’.140 It is hoped important messages such as this from senior judges will eventually filter 
down to practitioners who work with birth mothers and their children.   
These improvements to adoption practice would require what Martha Fineman terms as ‘a 
substantial reorientation of political culture, as well as adjustments to legal theory’.141 This 
seems unlikely when the political and legal position on adoption has evolved to place the 
child’s welfare as paramount, with the rights of birth parents  existing and solely surviving in 
relation to the child’s interests. It is therefore crucial that academic research continues to 
provide a voice for those who are silenced in adoption. This will ensure that evidence of the 
defects in the system is exposed.       
 
Conclusion  
This article has investigated the subjective impact of adoption law by presenting findings that 
are contextualised within the legal framework of the ACA. The focus has been directed 
towards the respective views, perceptions and feelings of birth mothers. From their narratives, 
it is possible to appreciate a great deal about the operational law, though the eyes of the 
women who gave birth to children now adopted by way of the state and the family courts. 
These personal accounts have provided depth and meaning to a problematic and controversial 
area of the law. Overall, there has been the commitment to analyse and disseminate 
respondents’ stories through their own words to achieve the study’s key objective; to empower 
those women by giving them a voice.  
 
 
  
     
 
                                                          
139 This recommendation originally cited by Charlton, Still Screaming, 28-29. This research was the 
primary inspiration for the current research.  
140 Lord Justice Macfarlane, 11. 
141 Fineman, M, A., ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20:1 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 9.      
 
 
